1; Drew G-3 (1863-1872) 1875 AV1 Kashmir AV1

some contact with it occurred indeed during the time from the sixteenth century onwards from the passage near, if not through, the country of the Mughal Emperors of Delhi towards Kashmir; or again when one of the Western invaders of India swept along at the foot of the hills, and the hill-men were able to annoy his armies while congratulating themselves on the rugged character of their own country, which made it by its poverty unattractive and by its difficulty of access even repulsive to those bent on rapid conquest and plunder. A little after the middle of the last century we find that the power of the Jummoo ruler, exercised either directly or by feudatory chiefs owing allegiance, extended eastwards to the Rávi River or nearly so, westwards to some miles beyond the Chinâb, southwards for some little way into the plains, and northwards as far as the beginning of Middle Mountains. The feudatory chiefs, those for instance of Akhnûr, Dalpatpûr, Kiramchi, &c., governed their own subjects, but to the ruler of Jummoo they paid tribute and did military service. During a portion of the year they would be present at Jummoo itself, attending the court of the ruler and holding separate ones themselves. At this day various spots in that town are remembered where each of these tributaries held his court on a minor scale. Doubtless there was some petty warfare, resulting sometimes in an extension and sometimes in a contraction of the power of the central ruler; but usually the chiefs were more occupied in sport than in serious fighting, and the various families continued in nearly the same relative positions for great lengths of time.

The rest of the Outer Hills and some of the Middle Mountain tract were thus occupied:—Eastward of Jummoo there were independent rulers at Basoli and Kishtwár, of Rájpût caste, some few details of whose history will be given as we come in our geographical survey to each of those places. North-westward of Jummoo were the two small states of Bhimbar and Rájáori, whose rulers were Muhammadans, Muhammadanised descendants of Rájpût Rajas, still bearing the Hindû title of Raja and still recognised as belonging to certain subdivisions of the Rájpût caste. These two had, I think, become more closely connected

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AVI Kashmir AVI

114 troops and the advice of His Highness's local authorities.

721 The occupation of the Gilgit district had never paid. The Dogras had suffered heavy loss in it again and again, but the honour of the Kashmir Durbar (the title usually applied to the government of a native state), would not for a moment permit of withdrawal. Moreover, withdrawal would not have answered the purpose of securing peace; it would merely have opened, by uncovering the right bank of the Indus, a road constantly used in former days for raiding into Baltistan or Little Thibet, the next province on the north-east belonging to Kashmir. The remedy would have been worse than the disease; a State which begins retiring is in the East the natural and lawful prey of its adventurous neighbours. I found no question of withdrawal being discussed; the attention of the Durbar was entirely turned to securing its position on the frontier, and to retaking the Fort of Chaprot. Throughout the winter nothing could be done, the passes leading to Gilgit were closed by snow, but with the return of spring every nerve had been strained to accomplish this object.

701 The Durbar was immensely proud of its army, which at this time was very numerous and costly. It was quite ignorant of the fact that the army was without the very rudiments of organisation, that it was merely an unwieldy agglomeration of units, and that its leaders, men for the most part of good family and of fighting instincts, were one and all as innocent as the babe unborn of the art of war. Trusting to the numbers of their troops and to the

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

well-known gallantry of the Dogra race, the rulers in Kashmir seemed determined to restore order on the frontier, and to wipe out the disgrace which had been inflicted on their arms. 701

Ignoring the enormous natural difficulties of the country, the villainous state of the existing tracks —roads there were practically none, when once the valley of Kashmir was left—and the conditions under which an expedition on its frontier must be carried on, the Durbar all through the spring and summer of 1888 poured thousands of men towards Gilgit. The army was without a trained general, had no staff, no proper transport, commissariat, medical, or ordnance departments, and was in short a mass of armed men without the semblance of organisation. The operations at Gilgit against the Hunza-Nagar tribesmen were to be directed by a committee of generals and sirdars, assisted by the Governor of Gilgit. Such an arrangement would elsewhere have been recognised as ensuring the failure of any military operations. As a matter of fact there was in the end no fighting, which was a mercy, considering the condition of the Kashmir army. The Durbar built a golden bridge for its revolted vassals, peace on the frontier was temporarily patched up, and the Kashmir troops, with the exception of the usual garrison, were withdrawn from Gilgit by the autumn. 701 721 [487]

After paying a farewell visit to the Maharaja, we started in one of His Highness's house-boats for Bandipur, the place on the Woollar Lake from which the road to Gilgit starts. The distance between Bandipur and Gilgit is about a hundred and ninety miles. 487

4: Durand G-8 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV I

denied. I studied the maps very carefully, and tried to get information which would settle the point one way or the other, but the phantom always eluded me, and the will-o'-the-wisp led me on: my judgment, backed by the experience of Ney Elia, was against the possibility of the existence of such a pass; still there might be one. Some of the shrewdest Kashmir officials believed in it, and they were most anxious to probe the mystery, for, in case of any further trouble with Hunza, a turning road might be invaluable. Their view was that the road existed, but that the friendship between the Hunza Chief and the local Rajas of Baltistan, who were closely connected, prevented the secret being divulged. It was essential to discover the truth and to set the matter at rest.

The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, come in to Kashmir during my stay there, and the condition of the Kashmir army, and the best steps to make it efficient, were naturally discussed. It was ascertained that the nominal expenditure on the army the previous year had amounted to twenty-three lakhs, the real expenditure to about twenty-nine, which represented half the revenue of the State, and that the army numbered over seventeen thousand men, with sixty-six guns. The condition of the military machine has been described before. The first thing to be done was to reduce the army, and to organise the portion it was decided to keep up. This, however, did not come within my province; all that concerned me was the number and the condition of the troops which Kashmir was to keep on the frontier.

By the middle of June 1889 my preparations were virtually complete, and the passes were open. I had

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1
Dard AV3

and the water poisonous, but no one seemed to mind. K
We found a splendid site for hutting troops three 712
miles above the fort, in a large alpine meadow. It was a natural parade-ground, surrounded by splendid fir forests, watered by pure streams which welled out from the foot of a moraine, behind which a glacier stretched up into the mass of Nanga Parbat. There was ample room for barracks and officers' huts, and it was an ideal summer cantonment; but the exigencies of the work that came upon us later forced me to keep the troops nearer Gilgit, and prevented my utilising the place, which remained undesecrated by the shout of the drill-sergeant and the crack of the rifle on the range.

There was nothing new about the march to Bunji, D 361
which place we reached in due course. I inspected the troops and fort here, and found forty per cent. of the former useless, and the latter wholly so. The K 712
housing of the men, the sanitary arrangements, the 701
warehouses for stores and supplies, were hopelessly bad, while against any serious attack the fort was impossible to defend. The men were terribly ill-fed, and all from eighteen months to two years in arrears of pay; in many cases they had drawn absolutely not a penny for eight months, and for some time previous to that an equivalent in English money of only two shillings a month. Most of them had received no uniform for several years, though stoppages had regularly been made from their pay for its supply. It was a marvel how the troops K
existed, but the Dogra is the most patient of men, 701
and there was nothing to be gained by deserting. The irregular regiments were in the most terrible

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

701 condition, mostly composed of worn-out old men or of boys, and half the force existed only on paper. I calculated that of all the troops fully seventy-five per cent. were unfit to serve.

705 A couple of days gave me time to consider what steps were most urgently required to put the fort in a proper state for defence, and to go into the most pressing question regarding the increase in the water-supply. On increased water-supply depended increased cultivation, and on this hinged the question of feeding the troops. An inspection of the available positions for a new and safer ferry over the Indus followed, and an afternoon's fishing at the mouth of a stream running into the Indus, where we got fairly good sport. The Indus itself was in high flood, and full of snow water, so we failed to move any big fish, but later in the year it would repay fishing.

A few more days saw us in Gilgit, where I spent a fortnight waiting for my stores and baggage, getting in to touch with the local authorities, and 701 in preparing for my visit to Hunza and Nagar. I 661 had received a letter while on the road from the Resident, asking me, in the name of the Kashmir Council, to receive a large sum of money which was being sent up, and to see myself personally to the payment of the troops. This was a fairly strong reflection on the honesty of the Kashmir official to come from the Durbar itself, and irksome though the 648 work was, I welcomed the opportunity offered. For me there were several advantages. The people of the country and the troops would see that money and power were on our side; that the Kashmir Government trusted us; that we were not above seeing to

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV 1
Dard AV3

K 648 ● 701 D 361

Besides being engaged in a duel with the very people who ought to have been helping me, I had plenty of work. The fort, the strongest in the Hindu-Kush in some ways, had to be thoroughly overhauled, and a scheme worked out for hutting the troops, who were huddled together in pitch dark hovels in which it was impossible to stand upright, and in which the stench could be cut with a knife. The drainage and water-supply of the fort had to be gone into, the head-waters of the canal which irrigated the Gilgit oasis visited, and some plan for its improvement devised; a good house for a hospital had to be found, and the drugs and paraphernalia stored, to be useless, alas! for a whole year, and lastly, my own house had to be put in order. The envoys from Hunza and Nagar had to be interviewed, and the details of my visit to these States arranged. I entirely declined to ask for hostages, as had formerly been the custom, and dismissed the hostages sent by Hunza, with handsome presents. Nagar, I felt, would give no trouble. Hunza was different, and was none too safe, but I did not believe that the presence of a relation of the chiefs in Gilgit would prevent our throats being cut; and it seemed to me more dignified not to bargain for our safety, but to trust to straightforward dealing on the spot, and to dry powder. The Governor of Gilgit was horrified at my manner of doing business, and took, I heard, a most gloomy view of the situation; it was in so many people's interest apparently to incite an attack upon us, and an attack on a small party like ours, in a country with the natural difficulties offered by Hunza, could have but one result—we should have been wiped out to a man.

K 648

1 [At Gilgit -- Analyst]

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

halted a couple of days at Chalt to pay the troops there and at Chaprot, and to write my report on the proceedings of the Mission.

Manners-Smith now left me to ride back to Astor and pay the troops there and at Bunji, and I marched into Gilgit, paying the troops at Nomal *en route*. I paid several hundred men with my own hands. Many of them had seen no pay for two years, but I received few complaints as to the correctness of their accounts. The Artillery to a man objected to having to pay extra for greatcoats, in addition to being mulcted for uniform, most of which they had never received, and I sympathised with them. The whole thing was a delightful example of red tape administration, the returns of uniform and pay were accurate and full, the only slight defect being that the uniforms were not forthcoming, and that the men were never paid. I found several men ill at Nomal, and not the slightest attempt made to do anything for them. The General had given orders that no sick men were to be sent into Gilgit, so that the want of medical arrangements might not be too glaringly apparent. But he had not counted on the unpleasant English habit of searching personal inspections. The want of humanity in the treatment of the troops did not strike the high-caste Hindu. You might not kill a cow in the country, but thousands of troops might be left to rot in foul barracks, with no medical arrangements for their care or healing, without a word of protest, or an attempt at alleviation. Kashmiri mal-administration was maddening, the covert opposition, obstinacy, and callousness of the officials were disheartening, but I could make allow-

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

CHAPTER IX

ADMINISTRATION AND WAR

OUR first years in Gilgit passed in peace and hard work, tempered by "excursions and alarms," born of the wild and ever-varying plots and intrigues indulged in by my native friends on all sides.

My position presented some of the curious anomalies to which the Indian Administrator on the frontier is accustomed. I was the representative of the British Government on the frontier, and the external relations with the neighbouring States were under my control. But the rule within the Gilgit border was in the hands of the Kashmir Governor, while the command of the forces rested with the Kashmiri General, with the proviso that no important move of troops should be undertaken without my sanction. It was a difficult position, for every one recognised that, in addition to my own responsibilities, I was really answerable for the proper government and progress of the Gilgit district, and for the discipline and control of the troops.

The difficulty was solved by the formation of an unrecognised Committee of Public Safety composed of the Governor, the General, and myself. We met two

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

to get up a better case if he wished to make mischief between his Commander-in-Chief and myself.

In consequence of my reports as to the condition of the frontier, and of the difficulties likely to arise with Hunza and Nagar, war with which had only been averted by my dash to Chalt, I had been summoned to Simla. Taking leave therefore of Raja Ram Singh, who extended his tour to Nomal, I started for India. During my absence the frontier was much excited by the military promenade of the Russians on the Pamirs, portions of which they annexed, and by their arresting Captain Younghusband on them, and marching him back to the limits of their newly acquired territory. On my arrival in Simla the whole question of the Gilgit frontier was exhaustively examined, and the Government of India decided to reinforce the Kashmir troops in the Gilgit Agency by a detachment of two hundred men belonging to the 5th Gurkha regiment, and by two guns of one of our native mountain batteries.*

Further, in consideration of the fact that the Hunza ruler had broken all his engagements with us, that an attack on the Kashmir garrison of Chalt had only just been prevented, and that it was more than likely that a further attempt would be made in the autumn by the tribesmen, the Government of India decided to order me to move troops to Chalt in October, to built a small fort there, and to improve the road between that place and Gilgit. I was instructed, when I moved the troops to Chalt,

* Blue Book. Correspondence relating to the operations in Hunza-Nagar, 1892.

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1

705 place, and scattered others along the road to act as transport officers. All responded well to the calls I made on them, and in little over a month I had a sufficiency of grain and stores landed at Gilgit, at the expense of tremendous exertions on the part of officers and men, and of considerable suffering to coolies and transport animals. For the third year in succession I cursed the ignorance and mismanagement of the authorities in Kashmir.

000 Before leaving Astor I received bad news. The detachment of Gurkhas, crossing the Burzil in cloudy weather, had been caught in fresh snowstorms, and eighty men and coolies were seriously frost-bitten. Among the sufferers was their Commanding Officer, Captain Barrett. Many of the unfortunate men died, and many more were maimed for life. Having made the best arrangements possible for the relief of the sufferers, I pushed on rapidly to Gilgit, and was not altogether pleased with the news which awaited me there. There were fresh persistent rumours of an intended attack on Chalt, and the garrison of that post had been allowed to fall short of food supplies. Foreseeing the necessity which might arise for rapidly preparing flour for the troops, I had given orders for a number of water-mills to be constructed; not one had been built. However, if there were shortcomings on the one hand, on the other there was cause for

• 701 satisfaction. The two best Kashmir regiments, under
648 the careful instruction of my staff officer, Captain Twigg, and of Captain Townshend, now Lieutenant-Colonel Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., of Chitral fame, had made rapid strides, and were in fairly efficient condition.

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 AV1 Kashmir AV1
Dard AV3
Chitral

K 563 631 offensive, and much in fear of the Chilasis, who in any raids in the Gilgit direction had to pass through their territory. The fighting force of Gor was insignificant, and the little state was tributary to Kashmir. The next republic was Darel; it was more important than Gor, and could turn out from a thousand to fifteen hundred men. The Durbar troops had in 1866 penetrated into the country, the people of which had made submission, and every year hostages were sent in to Kashmir, and a small tribute paid. Tangir, which lay next, was about equal in importance to Darel, and paid tribute to the rulers of Yasin. Below these tribes stretched a band of country inhabited by Kohistanis of different clans until the Pathan border was reached.

K [701]

I found on my arrival at Gilgit that the Gor headmen had expressed their anxiety to come more directly under the protection of Kashmir. They were anxious to avoid being drawn into trouble should the Chilasis, as seemed likely, create disturbances, and to throw in their lot openly with Kashmir seemed to offer them the best chance of security. In a few days their representative deputation arrived, and after listening to their views I dismissed them to their homes with suitable presents, pointing out that they had nothing to fear from our side.

D 643 159 648 Rather disturbing news now began to come from Chitral. Umra Khan of Jandol had moved over his border, and occupied a portion of Chitral territory, and Afzul-ul-Mulk clamoured for the despatch of the mission. The arrival of a mission and his recognition as Mehtar by the Government of India would

4: Durand G-3 (1888-93) 1900 /V1 Kashmir Av1

The changes
five years had wrought were great; the Kashmir troops on the frontier, instead of an ill-paid, undisciplined and ill-armed rabble, were an efficient body of troops regularly paid and well fed, who had given their proofs in severe fighting; good roads existed in the place of tracks torturing alike to baggage animals and laden men using them, and the rivers were bridged; extensive irrigation schemes, which were to prove of inestimable value to the people, were in hand; the authority of the Kashmir Government was firmly established on its frontier, and the influence of the British Government was paramount in the tract of country immediately south of the Hindu Kush.

I do not mean for a moment to infer that the work was complete, that perfection was attained, or that what credit there may have been was due to us on the frontier alone. The Kashmir troops, for instance, were but part of the great force of Imperial Service troops put at the disposal of the British Government in India by the Native Chiefs, but under us they had received their baptism of fire. It had been a great source of pride to me, who had followed the novel experiment with such cordial interest, to command Imperial Service troops at Nilt on the first occasion they had been in action, and to see them later in Chilas and elsewhere side by side with our own troops earning the admiration of all, and justifying their existence and the wisdom of the policy which had called them into being.

But some success we had achieved, and the object of the Government of India in establishing the

484 greater housing accommodation for travellers, huts have been constructed at a number of places. It is proposed to construct a chain of huts in Jammu. The existing camping grounds have been improved and new ones provided. A cafe has been established at Kokarnag and a tea shop opened at Patni top. Facilities have been provided for anglers. The rules regarding fishing and shooting in the State are liberal and more and more licences are issued every year.

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701 Eight Units of the State Army have been placed, one after the other, at the disposal of the Government of India for active service outside the State. Of these, the two Mountain Batteries and the Artillery Training Centre have been transferred to the Indian Army permanently. The demand for recruits is being met, and the Government of India have raised a large number of recruits for the Indian Army from the State.

652 Against the expenditure of Rs. 8,81,500 incurred by the Government on the Army Department in connection with the measures connected with the war during 1939-40, the expenditure for war purposes in the Army Department rose to Rs. 25,62,000 during 1941-42 and Rs. 22,75,000 during 1942-43. The total Army expenditure in 1941-42 amounted to Rs. 76 lakhs. The pay of all ranks serving in the State Army was recently revised, and the rates of Kit and H. M. Allowances were raised from Rs. 50 and Rs. 15 respectively to Rs. 120 and Rs. 50 respectively.

648 The State forces have distinguished themselves in the battles of Keran (Eretrea) and Damascus (Syria). His Highness presented eighteen completely equipped motor ambulances, and also placed a portion of the Kashmir House, Delhi, at the disposal of the Government of India free of rent for the accommodation of Government offices. Recently, His Highness placed his Lock-heed plane at the disposal of the Government of India for use in connection with the war.

747 His Highness has set up an influential War Aid Committee with Her Highness the Maharani Sahiba as President to raise funds for providing comforts for the troops. His Highness subscribes a sum of Rs. 1,000 per mensem